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Re:
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Worth L. and Annette c. Orton v. Collection Division of
Utah State Tax Commission, Case No. 930320-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and in response to the submission of pertinent
supplemental authorities by the Utah State Tax Commission,
appellants hereby call to the court's attention several recently
identified decisions. These cases pertain to pages 1 through 8
of petitioners'/appellants' reply brief.
The cases enclosed with this letter and considered
supplemental authority are:
1. Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v. industrial Comm. of
Utah, 1993 WL355459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) [not yet released for
publication] (in which the court specifically recognizes that
following submission of a motion for reconsideration a petitioner
"no longer has a 'final agency action' from which to appeal.");
2. Northwest Central Pipeline v. state Corp. Comm., 735
P.2d 241 (Kan. 1987) (giving definition to the term final agency
action when agency issues more than one Order);
3. Lopez v. Career Services Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568, 572
(recognizing necessity for appellate courts to have unambiguous
final administrative orders from which to calculate
jurisdictional time periods).
Sincerely,
STRONG & HANNI

Dennis M. Astill
AFT:mrs
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oner during his conditional release and Kan. 601, 702 P.2d 311 (1985), it is stated
what those conditions should be.
that discretion implies the exercise of discriminating
judgment within the bounds of
The problem that I have in this case is
reason.
Whether
the Kansas Adult Authat it is entirely possible that the evidence
thority
breached
a
nondiscretionary duty
developed by the plaintiffs in their disby
exercising
its
discretion
in bad faith and
covery may show that the members of the
in
a
reckless
manner
cannot
be determined
Kansas Adult Authority did not follow its
proscribed regulations and adopted a blan- without a full and complete analysis of the
ket policy to release a prisoner on condi- factual circumstances, which have not been
tional release in every case without any developed in this case.
concern whatsoever for the safety of the
In my judgment, this case should be republic
versed and remanded to the trial court with
Before the nonliability of the members of directions to afford the parties an opportuthe KAA in this case can be determined, it nity to develop the facts, so that both the
is my opinion that the trial court should trial court and an appellate court can deterhave reviewed the rules, regulations, and mine whether or not the Kansas Adult Auguidelines established by the KAA and thority is liable in failing to carry out its
then considered the nature and extent of obligation to impose conditions on a condithe decision-making process actually uti- tional release in order to protect the public.
lized by the KAA in releasing Bradley R.
HERD, J., joins the foregoing
Boan.
dissenting
opinion.
Before paroling a prisoner, the Kansas
Adult Authority is specifically required to
"consider all pertinent information regard| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
ing each inmate, including but not limited
to the circumstances of the offense of the
inmate; the presentence report; the previous social history and criminal record of
the inmate; the conduct, employment, and
241 Kan. 165
attitude of the inmate in prison; and the NORTHWEST CENTRAL PIPELINE
reports of such physical and mental examiCORPORATION, n/k/a Williams Natunations as have been made/' K.S.A. 1986
ral
Gas Company, Petitioner-Appellant,
Supp. 22-3717(g). The same considerations
v.
which govern the decision whether to parole or discharge a prisoner also should The STATE CORPORATION COMMISgovern the conditions to be attached to the
SION of the State of Kansas, Michael
release. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 22-3718 reLennen, Chairman, Margalee Wright,
quires that an inmate eligible for conditionCommissioner, Keith R. Henley, Comal release shall be subject to such written
missioner, and their respective succesrules and conditions as the authority may
sors in office, as members of the State
impose. The Kansas Adult Authority reguCorporation Commission, et al., Relations state that conditional releasees may
spondents-Appellees.
be placed, "under mandatory in-state paNos. 59735, 59738, 60143 and 60187.
role supervision" for 90 to 120 days or
longer and they may be subject to the same
Supreme Court of Kansas.
treatment and conditions as all other parolMarch 27, 1987.
ees while on parole. K.A.R. 45-10-1.
In my judgment, these rules and regulations require the Kansas Adult Authority
to consider the welfare of society when
determining whether to impose conditions
on releasees. In Hopkins v. State, 237

Petitions were filed seeking judicial review of actions of the Corporation Commission relative to an oil company's application
to amend its basic proration order to permit
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infill drilling. The Shawnee District Court,
James P. Buchele and Fred S. Jackson, JJ.,
and the Gray District Court, Don C. Smith,
J., dismissed the appeals on procedural
grounds. Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, McFarland, J., held that (1)
petitions for judicial review which were
filed before final action on rehearing were
premature, even if the Corporation Commission did not permit the introduction of
additional evidence on rehearing; (2) the
failure to permit additional evidence did not
render the granting of a rehearing a nullity
so as to make the underlying order final
agency action; (3) a pipeline company was
not required to seek a rehearing on the
rehearing order so as to nullify the effect
of the pipeline company's loss of the "race
to the courthouse"; and (4) the pipeline
company was not denied due process.
Affirmed.
Lockett, J., concurred in result
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
e=>704
Mines and Minerals €=>92.61
Corporation Commission's decision
granting amendment of oil company's basic
proration order to permit infill drilling in
field was not final for purposes of judicial
review after Commission granted rehearing, even if Commission permitted introduction of additional evidence only on some
issues.
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>704
Mines and Minerals <s=*92.61
Corporation Commission's failure to
open door to additional evidence on all issues, after rehearing was granted from
order permitting infill drilling in field, did
not render granting of rehearing a nullity
for purposes of determining whether petitions for review from original order were
premature.
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3»704
Mines and Minerals <3=*92.61
Pipeline company's petition for judicial
review, which was filed before Corporation

Commission entered its order on rehearing
of original order permitting amendment of
oil company's basic proration order to permit infill drilling in field, was premature
for purposes of determining whether county in which pipeline company filed petition
for judicial review had jurisdiction over another county in which royalty owners' association filed petition for judicial review on
date of rehearing order. K.S.A. 55-606(a).
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
<fc*664
Mines and Minerals <3=>92.61
Pipeline company was not required to
seek modification of rehearing order via
additional motion for rehearing before Corporation Commission, even if order on rehearing substantially modified original order, and, therefore, pipeline company's filing of motion for additional rehearing did
not defeat jurisdiction of county in which
royalty owners' association filed its petition
for judicial review after royalty owners'
association won "race to courthouse."
K.S.A. 55-606, 66-118b.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>664
Mines and Minerals <3=>92.61
Pipeline company could not nullify effect of its loss of "race to courthouse" by
simply filing additional motion for rehearing after Corporation Commission entered
rehearing order in proceeding in which oil
company sought amendment of its basic
proration order to permit infill drilling.
K.S.A. 55-606, 66-118b.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure
<S=>481
Mines and Minerals <s=>92.59
Pipeline company had no constitutional
or statutory right to rehearing of order in
which Corporation Commission permitted
infill drilling in proration order or, if rehearing was granted, to have reconsideration of all issues contained in underlying
order on which rehearing was granted.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
7. Constitutional Law <S=»318(7)
Each interested party in Corporation
Commission order on application to amend
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oil company's basic proration order to permit infill drilling did not have due process
right to judicial review in district court of
its choice; rather, judicial review was to
proceed in district court which first acquired jurisdiction. KSA 65-606(a); U.S.
GA. ConstAmends. 5, 14.

Northwest Central Pipeline Corp., of Tulsa,
OkL, was with him on the briefs, for petitioner-appellant.
Kirby A. Vernon, Asst Gen. Counsel,
argued the cause, and Brian J. Moline, Gen.
Counsel, Kansas Corp. Com'n, was with
him on the brief, for respondents-appellees.

Syllabus by the Court
1. Where the Kansas Corporation
Commission grants rehearing on an order
concerning amendment of a basic proration
order, a petition for judicial review filed
prior to the filing of the order on rehearing
is premature as no final Kansas Corporation Commission order has been entered.
The fact that the Kansas Corporation Commission order granting rehearing specified
certain areas on which additional evidence
would be permitted and supplemental oral
arguments allowed does not render the balance of the order ripe for judicial review.
2. Where the Kansas Corporation
Commission grants rehearing on an order
concerning proration, there is no statutory
requirement that a party aggrieved by the
order entered on rehearing seek rehearing
on the rehearing order as a condition to
seeking judicial review.
8. Judicial review of a Kansas Corporation Commission order relative to proration is discussed and held to lie in the
district court first acquiring jurisdiction in
the matter. The filing of a motion for
rehearing of the order on rehearing does
not defeat the jurisdiction of the court first
acquiring jurisdiction on a proper petition
for judicial review in the matter.
4. A party does not have a constitutional or statutory right to have motions
for rehearing granted by the Kansas Corporation Commission in a proration matter
or, if granted, to have reconsideration of all
issues contained in the order on which rehearing was granted. Denial of due process arguments relative to rehearings before the Kansas Corporation Commission
are discussed and rejected.

John C. Lovett, of Cities Service Oil and
Gas Corp., of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Stanford J. Smith and Stanford J. Smith, Jr., of
Robbin3, Tinker, Smith & Metzger, of
Wichi+a, were on the briefs, for respondentappellee Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp.

Mark H. Adams, II, of Adams & McCar>
thy, of Wichita, argued the cause, and J.D.
Steelman, Jr., Associate Gen. Counsel, of

Steven D. Gough and Alan R. Pfaff, of
Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg,
of Wichita, were on the briefs, for respondent-appellee Amoco Production Co.
N.E. Maryan, Jr., of Mobil Oil Corp., of
Denver, Colo., and Jerome E. Jones, and
Patricia A. Gorham, of Hershberger, Patterson, Jones & Roth, of Wichita, were on
the briefs, for intervenor Mobil Oil Corp.
Nefl 0. Bowman, of Mesa Operating Ltd.
Partnership, of Amarillo, Tex., J.A. Hannah, of Tenneco Oil Co., of Oklahoma City,
OkL, and Richard C. Byrd, of Anderson,
Byrd & Richeson, of Ottawa, were on the
brief, for interveners Mesa Operating Ltd.
Partnership and Tenneco Oil Co.
McFARLAND, Justice:
This consolidated case involves four appeals filed by Northwest Central Pipeline
Corporation (Northwest Central) in cases
where judicial review was being sought of
certain actions by the Kansas Corporation
Commission (KCQ relative, to infill drilling
in the Kansas Hugoton Field. Each of the
four appeals was dismissed on procedural
grounds by the respective district court and
Northwest Central appeals therefrom.
CHRONOLOGY OP EVENTS
July SI, 1984

April 24,1986
May 5-8,1986
May 16,1986

- GtiesSerrioe Ofl and Gas Corporation filed
application with KOCtoamend its basic proration order to permit infill drilling in the
Kansas Hugoton Held.
- KCC orderfiledi>ennittmg infifl driffing.
- Various motions for rehearingfiledby interested parties including Northwest Central
. KOC grants rehearing, permitting mtroduetion of additions! evidence onfr on some is»
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May 22,1986

- Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company files
motion with KCC seeking clarification of May
15,1986, order relative to whether, for judicial review purposes, certain portions of the
April 24,1986, order were final orders.
May 27,1986
- KCC order filed relative to May 22,1986,
motion in which KCC states no part of the
April 24,1986, order is a final order.
June 16,1986
- Northwest Central files actions in Shawnee
County and Gray County district courts seeking judicial review of KCC's order of April
24,1986, permitting infill drilling (appeal
Nos. 69,785 and 69,788).
July 18,1986
- KCCs order on rehearing filed at 1:15 pjn.
which triggered the following filings on the
same date:
0 ) Southwest Kansas Royalty Owners Association files for judicial review in Stevens
County District Court at 1:16 p.m.
(2) Northwest Central files for judicial review in Shawnee County District Court at
222 p.m. (appeal No. 60,187).
July 81,1986
- Northwest Central files motion with KCC
seeking rehearing on the July 18,1986, order
on rehearing.
August 6,1986 - (1) Rehearing of rehearing order denied by
KCC.
(2) Northwest Central files an action in
Shawnee County District Court seeking judicial review of all KCC orders relative to the
Cities Service application for infill drilling
including denial of Northwest Central's "rehearing of rehearing" motion.

The above listing provides the basic sequence of events involved in the consolidated appeals herein. Additional facts will be
stated as needed for discussion of particular issues.
ISSUE I. DID THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT COURTS ERR IN DISMISSING
EACH OF THE POUR ACTIONS HEREIN ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS?
APPEAL NOS. 59,735 and 59,738
These two petitions for judicial review
were filed the same day (June 16, 1986) in
the Shawnee and Gray county district
courts (86-C-849 and 86-C-24 respectively)
and are essentially identical. In each case
the action was dismissed on the ground it
was premature. More particularly, the
courts held that the KCC's April 24, 1986,
order was not a final order by virtue of the
granting of the rehearing on May 15,1986,
as clarified by the May 27, 1986, KCC
order. As the application was still pending
before the KCC, no final agency action had
been taken. Northwest Central contends,
alternatively, that
1. The April 24,1986, order was final as
to all matters upon which the KCC did not

permit the introduction of additional evidence upon rehearing.
2. The failure of the KCC to permit
additional evidence on all aspects of the
original order upon rehearing rendered the
granting of rehearing a nullity, thereby
making the April 24, 1986, order a final
agency action.
[1] Neither contention has any merit
The effect of the first contention would be
to allow piecemeal judicial review of the
KCC actions on matters before it Assume
an order covers ten issues. The KCC then
has second thoughts or reservations concerning its determination on the first issue
and grants rehearing for the purpose of
hearing additional evidence and argument
on that issue. Intervenor A might not like
the determination of issue two and seeks
judicial review thereof. Intervenor B
might not like what the KCC did on issue
four and seeks judicial review thereof, and
so on. The result would be piecemeal judicial review actions pending in various
courts while the KCC is still concerned
with the rehearing of its order. Obviously,
the KCC would be limited on the rehearing
to the first issue and would be unable to
modify any other part of its original order
even if a modification of the first issue
would necessitate modification of other
parts of the original order. The result
would be a procedural nightmare that
would seriously diminish the KCC's ability
to function. There is no statutory authority for piecemeal judicial review of the KCC
order herein. The>parties concede that judicial review of the KCC's action herein can
only be had by filing a petition for judicial
review within 30 days after a final order
has been entered. The specific statutes
relative to judicial review will be discussed
in a later issue. The question before us in
this issue is when the agency action, or
parts thereof, became final.
[2] The alternative contention that the
failure of the KCC to throw the door open
to additional evidence on all issues rendered the granting of the rehearing a nullity is equally untenable. The issues raised
by the application were complex and the
hearing thereon lasted some 56 days, in-
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volving over 100 witnesses and 12,000
pages of transcript The May 15, 1986,
order stated the KCC had enough evidence
in all but limited areas and limited new
evidence to those areas. There is nothing
weird about such a limitation. To hold
otherwise could have greatly delayed final
determination of the application for no useful reason. Appellate courts frequently
limit submission on rehearing which focuses attention on the area of concern. This
does not result in the balance of the appellate opinion becoming final or the granting
of the rehearing a nullity.
The order of May 15, 1986, granting rehearing caused the April 24, 1986, order in
its totality not to be a final agency action.
The May 27, 1986, order clarifying the order granting rehearing merely spelled out
that which was inherent in the May 15,
1986, order—namely, that no part of the
April 24, 1986, order was a final agency
action. Hence, no judicial review of any
portion of the April 24, 1986, order (or the
order of May 15,1986, granting rehearing)
was permissible until the order on rehearing was filed (July 18, 1986). The district
courts involved in these two appeals were
clearly correct in dismissing these two actions for judicial review filed on June 16,
1986, as being premature on the grounds
no final order of agency action had been
taken.
APPEAL NO. 60,187
[31 On July 18, 1986, at 1:15 p.m. the
KCC entered its order upon rehearing. At
1:16 p.m. the same day, Southwest Kansas
Royalty Owners Association filed an action
in Stevens County District Court (86-C-30)
seeking judicial review thereof. The Stevens County case is not before us. At 2:22
p.m. of the same day, Northwest Central
filed its action for judicial review in Shawnee County District Court (86-C-1010).
This case was dismissed on the ground the
Stevens County District Court had first
acquired jurisdiction. This determination is
in accord with K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606(a)
which provides that an "action for review
shall be brought in the district court having
venue and first acquiring jurisdiction of
the matter" Clearly, the Stevens County

District Court action was filed prior to the
Shawnee County action and thus Stevens
County first acquired jurisdiction as between these two petitions. Northwest Central does not argue that its July 18, 1986,
appeal (86-01010) is prior to the Stevens
County case. Rather, it contends one or
more of its other three petitions for judicial
review was or were proper and that July
18,1986, was not a legally permissible time
for seeking judicial review. Under no theory of Northwest Central would its July 16,
1986, petition for judicial review be valid,
but it has appealed from its dismissal (60,18*0 apparently as a matter of routine procedure.
We find no error in the district court's
dismissal of Northwest Central's July 18,
1986, petition for judicial review.
APPEAL NO. 60,143
[4] The KCC entered its order on rehearing on July 18,1986. On July 31,1986,
Northwest Central filed a motion seeking
rehearing on the rehearing order. This
motion was denied by the KCC on August
6, 1986. Northwest Central filed for judicial review in Shawnee County on the same
day (86-01084). The district court dismissed the petition on the ground that jurisdiction lay in Stevens County in case No.
8 6 - 0 5 0 filed July 18, 1986. Northwest
Central appeals from said dismissal in appeal No. 60,143.
Northwest Central contends that, inasmuch as the KCC's July 18, 1986, order on
rehearing substantially modified its April
24,1986, order that it had the duty to seek
modification thereof via a motion for rehearing and that the time for judicial review did not commence until the motion
was denied on August 6, 1986.
In support of its position, Northwest
Central cites K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 66-118b,
which provides in pertinent part:
"No cause of action arising out of any
order or decision of the commission shall
accrue in any court to any party unless
such party shall make application for a
rehearing as herein provided. Such application shall set forth specifically the
ground or grounds on which the applicant considers such order or decision to
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be unlawful or unreasonable. No party
termined by the commission within 30
shall, in any court, urge or rely upon any
days after it is submitted.
ground not set forth in the application.
"An action for judicial review may be
An order made after a rehearing, abro- brought by any person aggrieved by the
gating, changing or modifying the orig- agency action, whether or not such perinal order or decision, shall have the
son was the applicant for rehearing. If
same force and effect as an original
no petition for rehearing is filed, any
order or decision, including the obliperson aggrieved by the agency action
gation to file an application for rehearwho was not a party to the proceeding
ing, as provided in this section, as a
before the commission may bring an accondition precedent to filing an action
tion for judicial review of such agency
for review thereof" (Emphasis supaction.
plied.)
"(c) Any action for review pursuant to
this section shall have precedence in any
The difficulty with applying this statute
court and on motion shall be advanced
is that K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 66-118b applies
over any civil cause of different nature
to KCC proceedings involving public utilipending in such court In any such acties. The proceedings herein are not
tion, a county abstract may be filed by
brought under the act of which K.S A. 1986
the
commission or any other interested
Supp. 66-118b is a part The statutory
party."
(Emphasis supplied.)
requirement of seeking a rehearing of a
rehearing order is not contained in the judiK.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606 refers to the
cial review statutes applicable herein. act for judicial review and civil enforceK.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-606 provides in perti- ment of agency actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et
nent part
seq. K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 77-€13(b) provides:
"A petition for judicial review of an
"(a) Any action of the commission purorder is not timely unless filed within 30
suant to K.S.A. 55-601 through 55-609,
days after service of the order, but the
and amendments thereto, is subject to
time is extended during the pendency of
review in accordance with the act for
the petitioner's timely attempts to exjudicial review and civil enforcement of
haust administrative remedies/'
agency actions. The action for review
shall be brought in the district court
[5] Northwest Central argues that its
having venue and first acquiring juris- motion for rehearing of the rehearing order
diction of the matter. Notwithstanding was a timely attempt to exhaust its adminthe provisions of K.S.A. 77-622 and istrative remedies and it had 30 days after
amendments thereto, the authority of the the denial thereof to seek judicial review.
court shall be limited to a judgment ei- Under this logic, Northwest Central conther affirming or setting aside in whole tends it can nullify the effect of its loss of
or in part the agency action.
the July 18, 1986, footrace to the court"(b) Before any action for judicial house by simply filing another motion for
review may be brought by a person who rehearing. This is an unreasonable posiwas a party to the proceeding resulting tion to assume. The act for judicial review,
in the agency action, a petition for re- of which K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 77-613(b) is
hearing shall first be filed with the part, is a broad act covering all manner of
commission within 10 days from the agency actions, the vast bulk of which condate of the agency action in question. cern one party's dealings with an agency.
The rehearing shall be granted or denied In the matter before us, a large number of
by the commission within 10 days from parties intervened in the proceeding on the
the date the petition is filed and if not Cities Service application seeking amendgranted within 10 days it shall be taken ment of its basic proration order to permit
as denied. If a rehearing is granted the infill drilling. A major policy of the KCC
matter shall be set for hearing as was at issue, the determination of which
promptly as convenient and shall be de- would have far-reaching effects on the pro-
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duction of natural gas in Kansas. K.S.A. issues reviewed on rehearing before the
1986 Supp. 55-606 establishes the proce- KCC.
dure by which rehearing of the order here. ,. .
in may be obtained and does not authorize
™ As far as judicial review is cona rehearing on a rehearing. The July 18, cerned, such review is statutory. There is
1986, order on rehearing was a final order n o d u e V™*** n S h t f o r <*cli interested
and the Stevens County District Court ac- P ^ to » » * i u d i c i a l « * * * fa *" * * * *
quired jurisdiction of the judicial review court o f e a c h P art y , s choi <»- Judicial rethereof on July 18, 1986, pursuant to v i e w w a s obtained in the Stevens County
K.SJL 1986 Supp. 5(H>06(a). Northwest D i s t r i c t ^ ^ » «** <*"* fi»t acquiring
Central has sought and received permission jurisdiction under K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55to intervene in the Stevens County action 606 < a )- Northwest Central does not conand obtain judicial review of all or any tend **** lt w a s U i m t e d m ^Y way &°m
ful1
portion of the first KCC order.
participation therein.
We
We conclude the Shawnee County Disconclude this issue is without merit
trict Court properly dismissed 86-C-1084
The judgments are affirmed,
on the ground the Stevens County District
Court had first acquired jurisdiction of the
LOCKETT, J., concurs in the result
matter in issue.
ISSUE NO. 2. WERE NORTHWEST
Vw\
CENTRAL'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VI& IjU&EESS/
OLATED BY THE PROCEDURES HERE^^
IN?
[6] This issue is an amalgam of complaints concerning what Northwest Central
perceives to be egregious treatment it has
received from the KCC. In its lachrymose
recital of the KCC's actions herein, Northwest Central contends its due process
rights have been violated. The logic of
Northwest Central's argument is, however,
difficult to follow. Northwest Central does
not contend it was in any manner restricted
or deprived of the opportunity for full hearing before the KCC prior to the entry of
the KCC's order of April 24, 1986. The
shabby treatment complaints all arise in
connection with the granting of the rehearing and Northwest Central's untimely petitions for judicial review. Northwest Central contends, in essence, it had a right to
have the KCC review all issues on rehearing and that the KCC only reviewed certain
issues. There is no right to a rehearing—
the granting or denial of a rehearing is
discretionary with the KCC. Under its order granting rehearing, the KCC could
have changed any part of its April 24,1986,
order although the introduction of additional evidence and subsequent oral argument
was limited to certain areas. Northwest
Central has no due process right to have all
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Charles L. CARTER, Appellee,
v,
KOCH ENGINEERING, Appellant,
and
Aetna Insurance Company, Insurance
Carrier/Appellant
No.. 59331.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
April 9, 1987.
Review Denied May 15,1987.
Employer and insurer appealed judgment of Sedgwick District Court, Paul W.
Clark, J., awarding workers' compensation.
The Court of Appeals, Brazil, J., held that
(1) finding that worker had lost 80% of use
of his forearm was supported by substantial evidence; (2) healing period compensation could be properly awarded; (8) worker's violation of rules related to method of
running punch press did not take his activities beyond course of his employment; and
(4) worker's failure to use safety devices
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MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, INC., Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and Vicky Ann McCord, Respondents.
Nos. 920206-CA, 910413-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 7, 1993.
Fore BILLINGS, JACKSON, and RUSSON.
AMENDED OPINION CFN13
.LINGS
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from two decisions of the
tstrial Commission of Utah. The first appeal is from the Industrial
lission's determination that Maverik violated Utah Code Ann. ss 34-35-1 to 988 & Supp.1993), the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, in its treatment of
;y Ann McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial Commission's ruling
Maverik1s request for agency review was untimely. We dismiss the first
al and affirm the ruling in the second. We remand for assessment of
rney fees.
FACTS
Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms. McCord as a convenience store
k on September 30, 1988. CFN2D McCord worked six hour shifts, four days a
at $3.35 per hour during her two weeks of part-time employment. While at
on October 14, 1988, McCord experienced tightness in her chest and asked
s if she could go to the hospital. The doctor at the hospital indicated
rd 1 s heart was fine. McCord subsequently called Jones and offered to
sh her shift. Jones told her to stay home and rest. While talking to
rd later that day, Jones stated her mother had died from heart problems and
son had recently had open heart surgery. She expressed concern over the
ousness of McCord 1 s heart problems and indicated she would be afraid to
e McCord in the store alone. Jones then terminated McCord1s employment,
ord had answered "no" to an inquiry on the employment application regarding
her she had any heart problems which would limit her ability to perform the
She did have a condition known as mitral valve prolapse which the parties
ulated was a "usually benign condition." A doctor examined McCord after
was terminated and found employment posed no risk to her.
es subsequently filled out a company form, a Record of Employee Counseling,
ribing the event and indicating she was very concerned McCord^ heart
lem would reoccur if she continued her job with Maverik. In a later letter
ie Utah Anti-Discrimination Division <UADD), Jones again focused on her
?rn about a stress related reoccurrence. At the hearing before the
listrative law judge (ALJ) on the discrimination claim, Jones mentioned
additional factors for the termination. These were McCord 1 s difficulty in
Lng the gas pump meters and allegations that McCord smelled of alcohol at
These factors, however, were never discussed in the termination
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?rview nor noted on the termination form.
lord subsequently sought employment at numerous locations from 1989 to
L. She worked for a short time as a janitor at an elementary school but was
red to quit due to an unrelated illness.
^ord filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Utah fin,ti-Discrimination
with the UflDD on October 24, 1988. The UflDD found for McCord in an order
led January 24, 1991. Maverik requested a formal hearing before an ALJ. The
*ing was held on May 15, 1991. The flLJ issued findings of fact and
fusions of law on June 26, 1991. The ALJ1 s June 26, 1991 decision included
>ecific reservation of the issue of appropriate attorney fees. On September
1991, the flLJ issued a Supplemental Order disposing of the issue of
irney fees.
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court (first
>al). The first appeal is from the flLJ1s Order of June 26, 1991. On August
1991, McCord and the Industrial commission filed motions to dismiss the
t appeal based on Maverik1s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
of a final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered those motions
rred, and requested the parties include arguments on those issues in their
fs on the merits.
pite its pending appeal, Maverik then filed a Request for Review by the
strial Commission of the flLJ1 s June 26, 1991 and September 10, 1991
rs. The date the request was filed is unclear. Counsel for Maverik signed
dated the request October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates
ped on it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991. In later orders
rring to the request, the Industrial Commission refers to both dates as the
it received the request. For the purposes of our review, we assume the
est was received October 11, 1991.
February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik1 s Request for
ew based on its untimeliness. CFN33 On March 19, 1992, Maverik filed a
est with the Industrial Commission to reconsider its denial of the Request
Review. On March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied Maverik1s
est for Reconsideration. In this denial, the Industrial Commission
gnized it could have allowed the late Request for Review if Maverik had
n good cause for extension of the time period. The Industrial Commission
d, however, that Maverik had failed to show good cause for the extension.
April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request for Reconsideration" in
h it finally attempted to show good cause for its late filing of the
inal Request for Review. The Industrial Commission did not respond to this
ue motion. On April 7, 1992, Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this
t (second appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial commissions
r Denying Review and Order Denying Request For Reconsideration.
THE FIRST APPEAL—EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over the
t appeal. Regardless of who raises the issue, we must dismiss a case if we
rmine we do not have jurisdiction. Silva v. Department of Employment
, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App.1990) (per curiam); see also Thompson v.
son, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App.1987) (per curiam). "When a matter is
ide the court1s jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the
an." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah
L989).
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e basic purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
edies "is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its
cial competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to
rect its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v.
idson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818 (1972); see also Pacific
ermountain Express Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 316 P.2d 549, 5511 (Utah 1957)
cognizing correction rationale). Exceptions to the doctrine exist. For
mple, in instances where there is a chance that irreparable injury would
ur if exhaustion was required or where requiring exhaustion would serve no
ful purpose, the doctrine will not be applied. See Tax Comm'n v.
rson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989); see also Utah Code Ann. 63-46b2)(a) & (b) (1989).
In this case, Maverik appealed directly to this court thirty days after
ALJ 1 s ruling. The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act provides that following the
jance of an order after a formal hearing pursuant to the Act "either party
file a written request for review of the order ... in accordance with
tion 63-46B-12." Utah Code Ann. s 34-35-7.1(11)(a) (Supp.1993). This
DWS parties to an anti-discrimination hearing to take advantage of the
?ral UAPA agency review process. If no timely review is filed "the order by
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission." Id. s 34-35(11)(b). This section provides that the Industrial Commission need not act
;he ALJ 1 s order in any way for that order to take effect. Thus, on the day
?rik filed its petition for review the ALJ 1 s order was a final enforceable
?r of the Industrial Commission.
) next subsection of the Anti-Discrimination Act, however, requires an
%
ieved party to file for agency review under subsection 11(a) or lose the
irtunity for judicial review. CFN43 That subsection provides: "An order of
commission under Subsection (11)(a) is subject to judicial review as
'ided in Section 63-46b-16." Id. s 34-35-7.1(12) (emphasis added),
ection 12 could have easily provided that a final order under Subsection 11
subject to judicial review under UAPA. The clear import of the
slature's omission of orders final under subsection 11(b) is that they are
subject to judicial review, subsection 12 simply embodies the general
ciple that a party must exhaust its administrative remedies prior to
ining judicial review. Therefore, a party adversely affected by an order
n ALJ in an anti-discrimination hearing cannot obtain judicial review of
order until it has been subject to administrative review. Cf. Hitry Homeowners Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989)
ding Utah Code Ann. 54-7-15(2)(b) required application for rehearing prior
udicial appeal).
thermore, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
rently embodied in the general provisions of UAPA. One section provides:
arty may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
dies available...." Utah Code Ann. s 63-46B-12(2) (1989) (emphasis
d). This provides additional support for our decision. CFN5] We have no
sdiction over the first appeal and have no choice but to dismiss it. CFN63
II. THE SECOND APPEAL
A. Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction
erik contends the filing of the first appeal, regardless of its timeliness,
sted the Industrial Commission of jurisdiction to continue to act in the
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Thus, according to Miiverik, every action taken by the Industrial
ission after the ALJ's June 26 Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us
nd to the Industrial Commission for entry of the Supplemental order on
rney fees and the agency appeals process. Maverik does not provide any
vant authority supporting this contention.
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal from a non-final
r does not divest the administrative tribunal of jurisdiction. For
pie, in Fiebig v. Wheat Ridge Regional Center, 782 P.2d 814 (Colo.App.),
. denied, (Colo. Oct. 2, 1989), the court held an untimely petition for
cial review did not divest the agency of jurisdiction to act. Id. at
In Fiebig, an employee appealed his termination to the State Personnel
d. The Board referred the complaint to a hearing officer who ruled the
gations of sexual misconduct against the employee were without merit. The
ing officer, however, upheld the termination on the grounds the employee
d no longer perform his job due to the allegations. Both parties appealed
decision to the Board. The Board ruled the hearing officer's findings were
fficient and remanded the case to the officer for a new hearing. The
oyer appealed the Board's ruling to the court of appeals. Subsequently,
hearing the Board ordered was held and the hearing officer ruled in favor
he employee. The employer filed a motion with the Board to declare the
ing officer's order invalid on the grounds the appeal to the court
inated the agency's jurisdiction. The Board denied the motion. The court
ppeals upheld the Board's ruling because "an appeal to a court without
sdiction does not divest the agency of jurisdiction to proceed with the
on on the merits." Id. at 8i6. Accord Northwest Central Pipeline
. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 241 (Kan.1987).
ilarly, we have recognized a notice of appeal filed while a trial court is
idering a proper post-judgment motion does not confer jurisdiction on this
t. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah
1992), cert, denied, (Utah May 14, 1993). We reasoned "to permit an appeal
i be an affront to judicial economy" because allowing the trial court to
Dse of the motion might eliminate needless appeals and discourage pointless
/. Id. See also Williams v. City of Ualdez, 603 P.2d 483, 488 (Alaska
I (holding appeal brought from non-final order of a trial court does not
it court of jurisdiction); Knox v. Dick, 665 P.2d 267, 269
,1983) (holding "appeal from a non-appealable order does not divest the
L court of jurisdiction"). Likewise here, allowing an untimely appeal to
»t the agency of jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple appeals
needless delays.
?r the rule for which Maverik argues, a party who prematurely appeals an
:y decision could unjustly delay further agency action. The rationale
id allowing continuing jurisdiction in the agency following an appeal from
i-final order applies with equal force to allow continuing jurisdiction
} the action is subject to further administrative review. We thus follow
lister jurisdictions and conclude appeals from agency orders subject to
ter administrative review do not divest the agency of jurisdiction.
>fore, the Industrial commission had jurisdiction to act after the first
il was filed.
B. Timeliness
tcCord and the Industrial Commission argue we should dismiss the second
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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?al because Maverik1s Request for Review of the Final Order of the ALJ was
mely. Maverik responds its request was timely because either (1) Utah Rule
}ivil Procedure 6(e) gives it three extra days to file the appeal, (2) the
ng date is the date of nailing or, (3) the Industrial Conmission abused its
rretion in failing to extend the filing deadline by one day. The Final
»r was issued September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its Request for Review
iber 11, 1991. Whether URCP 6(e) is applicable or whether the crucial date
he nailing date are questions that involve the agency's application or
rpretation of general law which we review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for
ection of error. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581,
•89 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Conn'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah
1993). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah
I) (Durhan, J., dissenting).
Date of Filing
A provides a request for review must be filed "within 30 days after the
ance of the order
" Utah Code Ann. s 63.-46B-12U) (A) (1989). The
est must also "be sent by nail to the presiding officer and to each
y." Id. s 63-46B-12(l)(B)(IV). The parties agree the order was dated and
ed September 10, 1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868,
(Utah 1992) (holding administrative order is issued on date on face of
r).
erik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) gives it a three
extension on the thirty day filing deadline. That rule provides:
never a party ... is required to do some act ... within a prescribed period
r the service of a notice ... upon him and the notice ... is served by
, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period." Utah R.Civ.P.
(emphasis added). That rule must be read in light of section 63-46B)(A) of UAPA which requires a party to appeal thirty days after the
ance of the administrative ruling. Thus, Rule 6(e) does not apply because
r section 63-46B-12U) (A) of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the
ance of an order not from the service of an order on a party.
Filing Requirement
erik next argues Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5 CFN73 somehow supports its
ention the date of mailing is the relevant date. Rule 5(d) explicitly
gnizes a distinction between the filing of documents and the service of
nents on a party. See Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d). CFN81 All the language of Rule
lied on by Maverik relates to service on a party not to the filing of
ments necessary to start an appeal and is, thus, inapposite. Likewise,
rik's attempted reliance on the language of section 63-46B-12(l)(B)(IV) is
rsuasive. The requirement that requests for review be sent to the
iding officer and the opposing party is a requirement of service, not of
rig.
r
urther, it is clear that under the procedural rules which govern our
ts, filing requires actual delivery to the court. For example, in Silva
apartment of Employment S e c , 786 P.2d 246 (Utah App.1990) (per curiam), we
Lssed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim of a petitioner whose petition for
?w to this court arrived one day late in the mail. The petition had been
?d two days prior to the day the petition was due. We noted: "The
nent that an appeal is filed when mailed has been consistently rejected in
3ast and we reject it here." Id. at 247 (citing Isaacson v. Dorius,
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App.1989)).
Isaacson, the supreme court noted that interpreting filing as mailing
Id lead to chaos in appellate procedure. Isaacson, 669 P.2d at 851.
/erik provides no reason why we should interpret the term filing as used in
3 inconsistently with how we interpret it under the procedural rules used in
*ts. Thus, absent a showing of good cause for an extension, the term filing
ised in section 63-46B-12 requires, as a prerequisite to the agency taking
isdiction over a review, actual delivery of the necessary documents to the
\cy within the thirty day time limit.
Extension of Filing Deadline
ferik next argues the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by failing
jrant a one day extension of the filing deadline. Maverik does not identify
portion of 63-46b-16(4) under which it asks us to review this claim.
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 858 P. 2d 1281, 1286 n. 6 (Utah
1993) (encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4)
>r which review is sought). Because the authority to grant an extension in
ling deadline is not in an agency-specific statute, but rather a general
'ision of UAPA, and because Maverik is arguing an abuse of discretion
idard, it appears Maverik is necessarily seeking review under Utah Code
s 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of section 63-46b) provides we can grant relief if the agency action is "arbitrary or
icious." Id. We review agency action under this section for
onableness. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah
). See also SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993)
ham, J., dissenting).
The Original Request for Reconsideration
an agency to extend any deadline established under UAPA the petitioner
show good cause. See Utah Code Ann. s 63-46b-l(9) (1988). In its Request
Reconsideration, Maverik made no attempt to show good cause. The
strial Commission, in its order denying the Request for Reconsideration,
ifically notes Maverik1 s failure to show good cause. Thus, the Industrial
ission's decision denying Maverik a one day extension is not unreasonable
ight of Maverik's complete failure to articulate any facts on which to base
od cause determination.
The Second Request for Reconsideration
In a document captioned "Limited Request for Reconsideration" filed
1 3, 1992, six days after the original Request for Reconsideration was
ed and four days before the second appeal was filed, Maverik finally
mpts to show good cause. There is no authorization for a "Limited Request
Reconsideration" in UAPA. Counsel's failure to comply with the rules which
forth the requirements for getting an extension of the filing deadline does
give him the right to create another layer of administrative appeal. CFN93
ection of UAPA provides a petitioner with the right to file more than one
est for reconsideration. CFN103 Endorsing such a procedure would allow
•lievous counsel to use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless,
in some cases, harmful delay. Thus, this filing was appropriately
Bgarded by the Industrial Commission. CFN113
ATTORNEY FEES
ause we reject both appeals, we necessarily affirm the award of costs and
*ney fees and the award of damages authorized by the ALJ. The ALJ awarded
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I costs of $1536.26 to McCord. She awarded $19,731 in legal fees to
*d. She also awarded $11,632.80 in back pay to McCord. CFN123 These
Js are authorized by Utah Code Ann. s 34-35-7.1(9) (1988). We also award
%
d attorney fees on appeal under the same statute. Thus, we remand the
to the Industrial Commission for the sole purpose of assessing the
jpriate amount of attorney fees for this appeal*
CONCLUSION
»rik brought the first appeal prior to exhausting the available
ustrative remedies. Maverik brought the second appeal from a reasonable
\q of the Industrial Commission that Maverik1s Request for Review was
sely. Thus, we dismiss case
sber 910413-CA and affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission in case
?r 920206-CA. We remand the case to the Indu-trial Commission for the sole
purpose of assessing attorney fees on appeal.
15, 1988 to March 31, 1990
35 per hr for 24 hrs a week
J. 40 per week for 76 weeks
I 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991
ffi RPF hP fflP £4 hrs a week
L.20 per week for 52 weeks
I 1, 1991 to June 26, 1991
25 per hr for 24 hrs a week
52.00 per week for 12.5 weeks
3tal
» earnings at Ashley Elementary
Pay award equals

6,110.40

4,742.40

1,275.00
12,127.80
295.00
$11,832.80

<SON And RUSSON, JJ., concur.
FNl. This opinion replaces the earlier opinion in cases No. 920206-CA and
vlo. 910413-CA, issued June 3, 1993, pursuant to cross-petitions for
shearing granted August 28, 1993.
FN2. Because Appellant does not challenge the factual findings of the
Industrial Commission, we recite the facts in accord with those findings.
3ee King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P. 2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1 993).
FN3. In the Order denying the Request for Review, the Industrial
Commission also addressed and rejected Maverik1 s claims on the merits.
Because of our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do not comment on the
propriety of the Industrial Commission's disposition on the merits.
FN4. We note our concern that despite the inordinate amount of briefing
and conflict in this case, no party to either of these appeals directed us
to the determinative statute.
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FN5. Because we find the Anti-Discrimination Act required Maverik to
petition for review by the Industrial Commission, we do not directly
address, but merely acknowledge, some conflict between our decision and
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App.1991).
Although the Industrial Commission asks us to revisit that decision, we
find it unnecessary at this time. In Heinecke, we focused on the
language of Utah Code Ann. s 63-46B-12(l)(A) (1989) and held a petitioner
need not avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule prior to filing
an appeal to this court. We distinguished such permissive review from
review which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462. See also HiCountry Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah
1989) (holding review pursuant Utah Code Ann. s 54-7-15(2)(b) must be
exhausted prior to judicial appeal).
In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact of Utah Code Ann. s
63-46b-14(2) (1989) which provides: "A party may seek judicial review only
after exhausting all administrative remedies available...." Id. See
also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 n. 3 (Utah 1989) (citing
section 63-46b-14 for proposition petitioner must exhaust administrative
remedies prior to judicial review). According to the Industrial Commission
section 63-46b-14(2) requires a party to utilize every possible agency
review prior to filing an administrative appeal. We note Heinecke was
rendered without the benefit of briefing by counsel. Heinecke, 810 P.2d
at 462. Further, we specifically recognized we might revisit Heinecke
at an appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n.6. That day still
awaits.
FN6. Regardless of the premature nature of its appeal, Maverik asks us to
apply Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c) and find the appeal
procedurally proper. Maverik fails to note, however, that Rule 4(c) does
not apply to petitions for review of administrative actions. See Utah
R. App. P. 18.
FN7. Rule 5 relates to the service and filing of papers.
R.Civ.P. 5.

See Utah

FN8. That section provides:
311 papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be
filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time
thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents,
requests for admissions and answers and responses thereto not be filed
jnless on order of the court or for use in the proceeding.
Jtah R. Civ. P. 5(d) (emphasis added).
FN9. As our supreme court has noted in a different setting, if we allow a
second motion for reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to
srevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? " 'Tenacious litigants
and lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and
theoretically Cthis could go on] ad infinitum.1 " Watkiss 4 Campbell v.
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FOA 4 Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991) (quoting Drury v. Lanceford,
415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966)) (alteration added).
FN10. Likewise, under the administrative law scheme in place prior to UAPA
we noted that a petitioner could not file successive motions for review.
See Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P. 2d 602, 603 (Utah App.1987) (per
curiam). Under that scheme filing material which purports to supplement an
already denied motion did not revive the motion. Id. As we explicitly
noted in Ring, a petitioner is only "entitled to 'one bite of the apple1
on review before the Industrial Commission." Id. at 604. Under UAPA,
the same reasoning applies to requests for reconsideration, a petitioner
has only one opportunity to apply for reconsideration. See also Utility
Trailer Sales of Salt L~ke, Inc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987)
(recognizing rule against repetitive adjudications in arbitration
setting); Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1984)
(recognizing rule against repetitive challenges to Industrial Commission
determinations of spousal dependency); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App.1989) (recognizing rule against
successive post-judgment motions).
FN11. Even if we were to treat the second Request for Reconsideration as
procedurally proper, we would dismiss the second appeal. The request would
reinvoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. Under UAPA,
because the Industrial commission did not respond to the request it would
be deemed denied April 23, 1992 by operation of law. See Utah Code Ann.
63-46B-13(3)(B) (1989); Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568,
572 (Utah App.1992), cert, denied, 843 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Therefore
no "final agency action" for this court to review existed until after April
23, 1992.
UAPA provides:
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by
the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46B-12 is unavailable,
and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party
may file a written request for reconsideration with the agency.... Utah
Code Ann. s 63-46B-13(l)(A) (1989) (emphasis added). This section provides
a petitioner with the option of applying to the agency for reconsideration
or appealing to the courts. It does not provide a petitioner the
opportunity to pursue both routes concurrently. The emphasized language
indicates a petitioner who decides to file a request for reconsideration no
longer has a "final agency action" from which to appeal. The petitioner
must wait until the request is either responded to in writing or denied by
operation of law. Section 63-46B-13(l)(A) provides a request for
reconsideration is not a mandatory step in exhausting administrative
remedies or reaching "finality" to give the courts jurisdiction over an
appeal. Under UAPA, a request for reconsideration asks the highest level
of administrative decision maker to-reassess a claim they have previously
examined. A request for review, on the other hand, asks a higher level
decision-maker to evaluate the claim. Compare Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-12
(1989) (agency review procedures) with id. s 63-46B-13 (requests for
reconsideration). Petitioners who choose to take advantage of the
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
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statutory provision that allows them to request reconsideration must
thereafter accept the consequences, one of which is that an appeal to the
judicial system cannot be made until the agency acts on the request.
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would have given the
Industrial Commission another opportunity to address the merits.
Therefore, as of April 7, 1992, Maverik would have no final order from
which to appeal. Under this analysis, the second appeal would be brought
from a non-final order over which we have no jurisdiction and we would
dismiss it.
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal from the Industrial
Commission's denial of the second request would have been from April 23,
1992 to May 23, 1992. Thus, regardless of the analysis we apply, Maverik
is left without judicial review of the merits.
FN12. Counsel for Maverik has consistently complained no actual damages
amount was set in the ALJ1s order. He apparently is unwilling to do the
math using the formula established in the ALJ1s original order. To
eliminate any confusion and reduce future conflict in this unnecessarily
contentious litigation, we set forth the back pay calculation using the
formula established in the ALJ1s original order.
IF DOCUMENT
CQPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS

today and make that a part of the record
and I will consider the timeliness and
determine from that whether I can consider the merits.
The administrative law judge did not mislead Armstrong such that her right to a
fair hearing was jeopardized.

George A. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
v.

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
and Industrial Commission of
Utah, Respondents.

No. 910501-CA.
[5] Armstrong also argues her due
process rights were compromised by the
Court of Appeals of Utah.
short duration of the appeals period- We
disagree. The Utah Supreme Court previMay 27, 1992.
ously rejected this argument in addressing
the short statutory appeals period for those
appealing judgments from small claims
State employee sought review of juriscourts. Before a 1988 amendment indictional hearing conducted by Career Sercreased the appeals period to ten days, an
vice Review Board wherein Board deterappellant had only five days in which to
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to
appeal a small claims court judgment
hear his employment grievance. The Court
Nevertheless, the supreme court found this
of Appeals, Bench, PJ., held that (1) protime period did not deprive appellants of
ceeding was a formal adjudicative one that
their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Larit could properly review; (2) letter from
son Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d
hearing officer was not "written order"
233, 233 (Utah) (small claims court appeland employee's petition for judicial review,
lant having five days to appeal is not defiled within 30 days of date his request for
nied equal protection and is "given a reareconsideration of hearing officer's decision
sonable time within which to take an apwas deemed denied, was timely; (3) hearpeal"), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 909, 97
S.Ct 299, 50 L.Ed.2d 277 (1976); accord ing officer's refusal to consider employee's
Hume t>. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d written proffer of facts did not violate due
309, 311 (Utah 1979); see also Kapetanov process; and (4) Board lacked jurisdiction,
v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, insofar as employee was not subjected to
1052 (Utah 1983) (small claims courts' five- "de facto suspension" when he opted to
day appeals period does not offend due take unpaid leave of absence in order to
process and fact that other civil appellants attend law school, and employing agency
have a thirty-day appeals period "is of no did not violate personnel rule by deciding
not to allow him to job share.
consequence").
Affirmed.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the Board did not err in
declining to address the merits of Arm- 1. Administrative Law and Procedure
strong's untimely appeal.
Armstrong
<s=>796
failed to demonstrate good cause for filing
Questions regarding whether adminisher appeal late, the deadline for filing an trative agency has afforded petitioner due
appeal is not ambiguous, and Armstrong's process in its hearings are questions of
constitutional rights were not jeopardized. law, and court therefore does not give defTherefore, we affirm.
erence to agency's actions. U.S.C.A.
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur.

ConstAmends. 5, 14.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1)
Jurisdictional determinations are questions of law to which Court of Appeals
gives no deference.

Cite as 854 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992)

3, Administrative Law and Procedure
Officers and Public Employees e=»72.41
Administrative appeal by state employee seeking review of jurisdictional hearing
conducted by Career Service Review Board,
wherein Board determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear employee's grievance, was formal adjudicative proceeding
that Court of Appeals could properly review; hearing was conducted and there
was no showing that any of the statutory
requirements of formal hearing set forth in
Utah Administrative Procedure Act had not
been met U.CJL1953, 63-46b-8, 63-46b16.
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
<^723
Officers and Public Employees $=>72.47
Hearing officer's letter sent nine days
after state employee requested that officer
reconsider her decision, stating that officer
had read employee's motion and that it had
not persuaded her to change her decision,
was not "written order" within meaning of
Utah Administrative Procedure Act, insofar as it was not sufficiently detailed; thus,
employee's request for reconsideration was
deemed denied as matter of law 20 days
after it was filed, and his petition for judicial review, filed within 30 days of deemed
denial, was timely. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b10(1), 63-46b-13(3)(a, b), 63-46b-14(3)(a).
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5- Administrative Law and Procedure
<S=>469
Constitutional Law e=>278.4(5)
Officers and Public Employees <3=>72«16
Even if hearing officer improperly refused to consider state employee's written
proffer of facts, that refusal did not violate
due process, absent showing that hearing
officer's actions were patently unfair; employee was allowed to testify at length in
lieu of written statement, which did not
contain a single fact that employee was not
allowed to present orally* U.S.C.A. Const
Amends. 5, 14.

6. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72,61
State employee had burden of showing
that his grievance fit into statutorily designated category in order to bring that grievance before Career Service Review Board.
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l).
7. Officers and Public Employees <s=72.22
For purposes of determining whether
Career Service Review Board had jurisdiction of its grievance, senior investigator
with Utah State Industrial Commission was
not given "de facto suspension" when Commission required him to take unpaid leave
of absence in order to attend law school;
employee made conscious decision to attend
law school after being formally notified
that he would be required to take a leave of
absence if he did so. U.C.A.1953, 67-19a202(1).
8. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72.22
For purposes of determining whether
Career Service Review Board had jurisdiction to hear state employee's grievance,
Utah State Industrial Commission's decision not to allow senior investigator to job
share did not violate personnel rule, insofar
as rule gave Commission full discretion as
to whether job sharing would be allowed.
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l).
Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Before BENCH, PJ., and ORME and
RUSSON, JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Lopez seeks review of a jurisdictional hearing conducted by respondent
Career Service Review Board (the Board),
wherein the Board determined that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear Lopez's employment grievance. We affirm.
FACTS
Lopez is a senior investigator with the
Utah State Industrial Commission (the
Commission). He claims that in 1989 he

saw a clear trend by the Commission towards using investigators with legal training.1 Since Lopez had no legal training, he
decided that it would be to his professional
advantage to attend law school He applied for and was accepted to the University of Utah law school. Upon learning of
his acceptance, Lopez requested that he be
allowed to work part-time while attending
law school. His immediate supervisor informed him in writing that his proposal to
work part-time was rejected. Lopez nevertheless pursued additional discussions in an
attempt to accommodate the interests of
the Commission. Various alternatives
were discussed, but none was accepted.
Lopez claims that at one point in the
discussions his supervisor asked him to
draft a contract reflecting his proposal to
work part-time on a job share basis. Lopez
assumed that the request indicated that his
job share proposal had been accepted. The
contract he prepared, however, was never
expressly accepted or rejected by the Commission.
Lopez went to law school. Part of his
proposed plan was that he would use his
annual leave while adjusting to law-school
life. He therefore took approximately one
month of annual leave at the beginning of
the school year. When he attempted to
return to work part-time, however, he was
informed that his proposal to job share was
still unacceptable. The Commission offered him the opportunity to work at a
temporary level for 19 hours a week, but,
because it was a temporary position, he
would be required to relinquish his career
service status. In the alternative, the Commission was willing to grant him a leave of
absence without pay, thereby keeping his
status intact The only other alternative
was for him simply to resign his position.
Lopez opted to take the leave of absence
1. The Commission denies any trend, but it does
admit that in advertisements for investigators it
had indicated that preference would be given to
those with legal training.
2. The Commission asserts that UAPA does not
govern this case because UAPA does not apply
to "internal personnel actions within an agency
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions." Section 63-46b-l(2)(e).
The Board errs in asserting that the Board's

and, under protest, signed an agreement to
that effect. Following his first year of law
school, Lopez returned to full-time work
with the Commission in his former position.
Lopez filed a grievance that progressed
unsuccessfully through the Commission's
internal review process. Lopez then requested an evidentiary hearing before the
Board. Inasmuch as there was some question whether the Board was authorized to
hear the grievance, the administrator of
the Board ordered that a jurisdictional
hearing be conducted. The administrator
then recused himself due to a conflict
caused by his involvement with an advisory
board of the Commission, and a hearing
officer was appointed to conduct the hearing.
At the hearing, Lopez "proffered" his
version of the facts in writing. The hearing officer refused to accept his written
version due to its length and argumentative nature. The Commission proposed its
own "chronology" of events and documents, which was admitted without objection from Lopez. Lopez was then allowed
to testify as to any facts he felt were
relevant His counsel questioned him for
approximately three hours. The hearing
officer then ruled that the grievance did
not come within any of the statutory categories over which the Board had jurisdiction. The hearing officer further held that
Lopez was not harmed by the Commission's
actions because he was allowed to return to
his former position after the leave of absence.
In accordance with section 13 of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1989),
Lopez requested that the hearing officer
reconsider her decision.2 The decision was
not altered, and Lopez filed this petition for
actions constitute "internal personnel actions
within an agency.** The Board is an agency
external to the Commission to which personnel
matters are appealed. UAPA therefore applies.
This conclusion is supported by statutory language within the chapter establishing the Board
that indicates UAPA applies to actions by the
Board. See, e.g.t Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a202(2), 67-19a-203(6) (1986).
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review. He alleges three principal errors
by the hearing officer: (1) the refusal to
accept his written proffer of facts was a
denial of due process, (2) the conclusion
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to
hear his grievance was erroneous, and (3)
the finding that he was not harmed by the
Commission's actions was clearly erroneous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Questions regarding whether an
administrative agency has afforded a petitioner due process in its hearings are questions of law. We therefore do not give
deference to the agency's actions. Tolman
v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 28 (Utah App.1991). Jurisdictional determinations are questions of law to which
we give no deference. Department of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132
(Utah 1989).

proceedings as formal, and transferred the
case to district court for a trial de novo.
Id.
In the present case, the hearing officer
conducted a hearing. Lopez was allowed
to appear before the hearing officer and to
present his position. Evidence and documents were accepted into the record, and
a court reporter was present There has
been no showing that any of the requirements of a formal hearing, as set forth in
section 8 of UAPA, have not been met
Since there was a hearing, and there is no
showing of any violations of section 8, we
conclude that this was a formal adjudicative proceeding that we may properly review.

Timeliness
[4] The second jurisdictional question
involves the timeliness of Lopez's petition
to this court. The hearing officer entered
her decision on July 2, 1991. Lopez requested on July 22nd that the hearing offiOUR JURISDICTION
cer reconsider her decision. On July 31st,
Before addressing the merits of the peti- the hearing officer sent Lopez a letter.
tion, we consider two threshold questions The full text of the letter was as follows:
as to whether this court has jurisdiction. "I have read your Motion for Reconsideration and Evidentiary Hearing. This letter is to notify you that your motion has
Formal or Informal Proceedings
[3] The first jurisdictional question in- not persuaded me to change my decision."
volves whether this administrative appeal Lopez filed this petition for review on Sepshould be before the district court. UAPA tember 3rd.
provides that district courts have exclusive
Subsection 14(3)(a) of UAPA provides:
jurisdiction over administrative appeals "A party shall file a petition for judicial
from informal adjudicative proceedings. review of final agency action within 30
Section 63-46b-15. Administrative appeals days after the date that the order constitutfrom formal adjudicative proceedings are ing the final agency action is issued or is
to be made either to this court or to the considered to be issued under Subsection
supreme court. Section 63-46b-16.
63-46b-13(3Xb)." Subsection 13(3} applies
Administrative appeals that are improp- to requests that an agency reconsider its
erly brought to this court are to be trans- action and provides:
(a) The agency head, or a person desigferred to the district court pursuant to
nated for that purpose, shall issue a writUtah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.
ten order granting the request or denyAlumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah
ing the request
App.1990). In Alumbaugh, the administra(b) If the agency head or the person
tor of the Career Services Review Board
designated for that purpose does not isconducted an administrative review of an
sue an order within 20 days after the
employee's grievance file without a hearfiling of the request, the request for
ing. We held that the absence of a hearing
reconsideration shall be considered to be
made the Board's action informal, despite
denied.
the Board's designation of all adjudicative

The issue is whether the letter from the
hearing officer constitutes a "written order." If it does, then Lopez's appeal is
untimely, the thirty days having run their
course on August 30th, four days before
Lopez filed his petition. If the letter did
not constitute a written order, then Lopez's
request for reconsideration was deemed denied, as a matter of law, on August 11th,
twenty days from his request Lopez's
filing on September 3rd would therefore be
timely.
Section 10 of UAPA requires considerable detail in agency orders issued in connection with formal adjudicative proceedings.
It states, in pertinent part
(1) Within a reasonable time after the
hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required
by any applicable statute or rule of the
agency, the presiding officer shall sign
and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact . . . ;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for
the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered
by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for
reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order
available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any
reconsideration or review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1989).
An ambiguous letter, merely indicating
that the request for reconsideration was
unpersuasive, does not constitute a "written order" as described in subsection 10(1).
As a matter of appellate necessity, we
must have unambiguous final administrative orders from which we may calculate
jurisdictional time periods. Otherwise, our
jurisdiction can become uncertain.
Inasmuch as the hearing officer's letter
was insufficient to constitute a written order as anticipated by subsection 13(3)(a),
Lopez's request for reconsideration is

deemed denied on August 11th under subsection 13(3)(b). His petition for review is
therefore timely.
THE MERITS
Proffer of Facts
[5] Lopez first asserts that the hearing
officer denied him due process by not considering his written proffer of facts. He
relies upon Tolman for the proposition that
"due process demands a new trial when the
appearance of unfairness is so plain that
[the appellate court is] left with the abiding
impression that a reasonable person would
find the hearing unfair." Tolman, 818
P.2d at 28 (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Utah
1987)). Even if it were, improper for the
hearing officer to refuse to consider Lopez's written version of the facts, as asserted by Lopez, he has nevertheless failed to
present to this court any explanation of
how the actions of the hearing officer were
patently unfair. At the hearing, Lopez
was allowed to testify at length in lieu of
the written statement He has not directed
us to a single fact contained in the written
statement that he was not allowed to
present orally to the hearing officer. Given Lopez's opportunity to testify, we simply are not left with an abiding impression
that a reasonable person would find the
hearing unfair.
Jurisdiction of Board
The Board was established to provide
state civil service employees with a forum
for appealing personnel decisions outside
the agency for which they work. The
Board, however, does not have jurisdiction
to hear all appeals of all personnel matters.
Its jurisdiction is statutorily limited to certain agency actions.
(a) The board shall serve as the final
administrative body to review appeals
from career service employees and agencies of decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written
reprimands, wages, salary, violations of
personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reduc-

tions in force, and disputes concerning
abandonment of position that have not
been resolved at an earlier stage in the
grievance procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to
review or decide any other personnel
matters.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l) (Supp.
1991) (emphasis added).3
When an employee files a grievance with
the Board, subsection 403(2)(a) requires the
Board's administrator to determine the following factors before the Board may hear
the grievance.
(i) whether or not the employee is a
career service employee and is entitled to
use the grievance system,
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance,
(iii) whether or not the employee has
been directly harmed; and
(iv) the issues to be heard.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a) (Supp.
1991).
In order to make the determinations required, the administrator may "hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both/1 Subsection 67-19a403(2)(b)(i). This was the basis and goal of
the jurisdictional hearing from which Lopez
now appeals.4
[6] Lopez initially challenges the hearing officer's determination that the Board
lacked jurisdiction by asserting that the
Board's administrator erroneously placed
the "burden of proof" on Lopez to prove
that the Board had jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that a party wishing to bring a matter before a tribunal with limited subject
matter jurisdiction must present sufficient
facts to invoke the limited jurisdiction of
that tribunal. Department of Social
3. All other matters may be grieved only to the
level of the department head whose decision is
final and unappealable to the Board. See Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(2) (Supp.1991).
4, Lopez asserts that the hearing officer improperly treated the jurisdictional hearing as a hearing on the merits. There is some language in
the hearing officer's decision that supports his
claim. As indicated in subsection 403(2)(b), the
jurisdictional hearing is to consider the four

Servs. v. Vijil, 784 R2d 1130, 1132 (Utah
1989). It was therefore necessary for Lopez to show that his grievance fit into one
of the categories of grievances designated
in subsection 202(1) in order to bring his
grievance before the Board.
[7] Lopez argues the Board has jurisdiction because the Commission's requirement that he take a leave of absence without pay was a "de facto suspension/1 The
hearing officer, however, found that Lopez
made a conscious decision to attend law
school and that his decision was made after
he had been formally notified that he would
be required to take a leave of absence if he
were to attend law school. The hearing
officer also found that the ongoing discussions between Lopez and the Commission
concerning other possible work alternatives
had not resulted in a meeting of the minds.
Given the hearing officer's factual findings, it is clear that the unpaid leave of
absence was the direct result of Lopez's
unilateral and voluntary decision to attend
law school. It was not in any way initiated
by the Commission. The record is clear
that Lopez was always free to remain in
his job full time as long as he did not elect
to attend law school. He may not now
transform the direct result of his own voluntary decision into a "de facto suspension" by the Commission.
[8] Lopez also argues that the Commission violated several personnel rules when
it refused to allow him to work during law
school. As stated in subsection 202(1),
grievances arising from violations of personnel rules are within the Board's jurisdiction. Lopez points to Human Resource
Management Rule R468-5-12, which states
with our emphasis:
factors set out in subsection 403(2)(a). If an
employee's grievance meets the statutory requirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the employee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the
claim. Any language suggesting that the hearing officer considered the actual merits of Lopez's grievance was nevertheless harmless since
the factual findings clearly show that jurisdiction was lacking as a matter of law.

program of job sharing as a means of
increasing opportunities for career parttime employment. In the absence of an
agency program, individual employees
may request approval for job sharing
status through agency management.
Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-12 (1991).
The hearing officer held that the Commission's decision not to allow Lopez to job
share was not a violation of this policy
because the rule gives the Commission full
discretion whether to allow job sharing.
The hearing officer reasoned that since
there was no mandate that job sharing be
allowed, job sharing was a privilege that
might be granted by the Commission, but it
was not a right to which Lopez was entitled
by law. Since the Commission's decision
not to allow job sharing was within its
discretion, Lopez's complaint could not logically constitute a claim that a personnel
rule had been "violated." We agree.
Discretionary personnel powers granted
to agencies do not constitute mandates.
Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right Since
there was no mandate requiring the Commission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez
has failed to identify any personnel rule
that was violated by the Commission's refusal to allow him to job share. Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied.5
Harm to Lopez
Finally, Lopez claims that the hearing
officer erred when she found that he had
not been harmed by being "required" to
take an unpaid leave of absence because he
was able to return to his former position.
Whether Lopez was directly harmed by the
Commission's action is the third factor to
be determined at a jurisdictional hearing.
See section 67-19a-403(2)(aXiii). However,
the hearing officer did not need to reach
this issue because she determined that Lopez's grievance did not fall within the cate5. Lopez also points to the Human Resource
Management Rules regarding Time Limited Positions," Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-10 (1991),
and "Education Assistance," Utah Admin.Code
§ R468-HM (1991). We limit our discussion to

had jurisdiction. Regardless of whether or
not Lopez was harmed, the Board could not
hear the grievance. We therefore need not
address this final claim of error.
CONCLUSION
The hearing officer's finding that the
Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Lopez's
grievance is affirmed.
ORME and RUSSON, JJ.f concur.

Jasbir S. BHATIA, Petitioner,
v.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY; and Pizza Hut of
Utah, Respondents.
No. 910498-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 2, 1992.

Cook sought judicial review of final
decision of Board of Review of Industrial
Commission denying his application for unemployment compensation benefits. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ.,
held that cook who stormed out of restaurant during middle of busy shift after uttering vulgarity to manager was discharged for "just cause" and not entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits.
Affirmed.
Bench, PJ., concurred and filed opinion.
the policy on job sharing since our analysis
applies equally to all three policies. Under
these rules, agencies are given the ability to
create time limited positions and provide education assistance in their discretion.

